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Abstract. In this paper, we study the effect of preferential assistance on cooperation
in the donation game. Cooperators provide benefits to their neighbors at some costs.
Defectors pay no cost and do not distribute any benefits. The total contribution of
a cooperator is fixed and he/she distributes his/her contribution unevenly to his/her
neighbors. Each individual is assigned a weight that is the power of its degree, where
the exponent α is an adjustable parameter. The amount that cooperator i contributes
to a neighbor j is proportional to j’s weight. Interestingly, we find that there exists an
optimal value of α (which is positive), leading to the highest cooperation level. This
phenomenon indicates that, to enhance cooperation, individuals could give high-degree
neighbors more help, but only to a certain extent.
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1. Introduction
Evolutionary game theory has been frequently employed as the theoretical framework
to explain the emergence of cooperation among selfish individuals [1]. One of the most
used game model is the prisoner’s dilemma game (PDG) [2]. In PDG played by two
individuals, each one simultaneously decides whether to cooperate or to defect. They
both receive R upon mutual cooperation and P upon mutual defection. If one cooperates
but the other defects, the defector gets the payoff T , while the cooperator gains the
payoff S. The payoff rank for PDG is T > R > P > S. With the rapid development
of network science, studies of PDG and other game models are implemented on various
networks [3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8], including regular lattices [9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16], random
graphs [17, 18], small-world networks [19], scale-free networks [20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25],
multiplex networks [26, 27] and so on. For a given network, nodes represent individuals
and links reflect social relationships. Individuals play the PDG with their direct
neighbors.
An important special case of the PDG is the so-called donation game, where a
cooperator provides a benefit b to the other player at his/her cost c, with 0 < c < b. A
defector pays no cost and does not distribute any benefits. Thus, the payoff parameters
in the donation game are T = b, R = b − c, P = 0, and S = −c. Ohtsuki et. al.
discovered that natural selection favors cooperation if the benefit-to-cost b/c exceeds the
average number of neighbors [28]. Allen et. al. provided a solution for weak selection
that applies to any network and found that cooperation flourishes most in societies which
are based on strong pairwise ties [29]. Wu et. al. investigated impact of heterogeneous
activity and community structure on the donation game [30]. Hilbe et. al. showed
that in large, well-mixed populations, extortion strategies can play an important role,
but only as catalyzers for cooperation and not as a long-term outcome [31]. Szolnoki
and Perc found that extortion is evolutionarily stable in structured populations if the
strategy updating is governed by a myopic best response rule [32]. Xu et. al. discovered
that extortion strategies can act as catalysts to promote the emergence of cooperation
in structured populations via different mechanisms [33].
In previous studies of the spatial donation game, a cooperator treats all neighbors
equally and contributes to each neighbor with the same cost. However, in real life, an
individual usually has a preference for somebody and provides more benefit to him/her.
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An example is that altruistic act happens more frequently among genetic relatives [34].
In this paper, we propose a heterogeneous donation game in which a cooperator helps
one of his/her neighbors with the cost proportional to the neighbor’s weight. We assign
each individual i a weight kαi , where ki is i’s degree and α is an adjustable parameter.
We have found that, the cooperation level can be maximized at an optimal value of α.
2. Model
A cooperator i provides a benefit rcij to a neighbor j at a cost cij , where r is the benefit-
to-cost ratio. For simplicity, we assume that r is the same for all pair interactions. The
total cost of cooperator i is
ci =
∑
jǫΩi
cij, (1)
where the sum runs over all the direct neighbors of i (this set is indicated by Ωi). A
defector pays no cost and does not distribute any benefits.
Each individual i is assigned a weight kαi , where ki is i’s degree and α is an adjustable
parameter. For a fixed ci, cooperator i helps one of its neighbors j with a cost cij
proportional to j’s weight
cij = ci
kαj∑
lǫΩi
kαl
. (2)
For α > 0(< 0), cooperators give high-degree (low-degree) neighbors more help. In the
case of α = 0, a cooperator provides the same benefit to each neighbor.
The payoff of individual i is given by
Mi = −cisi + r
∑
jǫΩi
cjisj, (3)
where si = 1 if i is a cooperator and si = 0 if i is a defector. Note that the donation is
not symmetric, i.e., cij 6= cji.
After each time step, all individuals synchronously update their strategies as follows.
Each individual i randomly chooses a neighbor j and adopts j’s strategy with the
probability [35]
W (si ← sj) = 1
1 + exp[(Mi −Mj)/β] , (4)
where the parameter β (> 0) characterizes noise to permit irrational choices. As the
noise β decreases, the individuals become more rational, i.e., they follow the strategies
of neighbors who have obtained higher payoffs with greater probabilities.
3. Results and analysis
We carry out our model in Baraba´si-Albert (BA) scale-free network [36] with size
N = 5000. Without loss of generality, we assume that each cooperator pays the same
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Figure 1. (Color online) The fraction of cooperators ρc as a function of the benefit-
to-cost ratio r for different values of α. The average degree 〈k〉 = 10 and the noise β
= 0.5. For each α, ρc increases to 1 as r increases.
total cost (ci = 1 for any cooperator i). Initially, the two strategies, cooperation and
defection, are randomly distributed among the individuals with the equal probability
1/2. The equilibrium fraction of cooperators ρc is obtained by averaging over the last
104 Monte Carlo time steps from a total of 105 steps. Each data point results from 20
different network realizations with 10 runs for each realization.
Figure 1 shows the fraction of cooperators ρc as a function of the benefit-to-cost
ratio r for different values of α. One can see that for each value of α, ρc increases to 1
as r increases. For a small value of α (e.g., α = −0.1), cooperators die out when r is
close to 1. However, for a large value of α (e.g., α = 0.5 or α = 1.5), cooperators can
still survive, even if r = 1.
Figure 2 shows the dependence of ρc on α. One can see that for fixed values of
other parameters, there exists an optimal value of α (denoted as αopt), leading to the
maximal ρc. The value of αopt is not fixed. From the insets of Fig. 2, one can see that
αopt decreases as r increases, but increases as the average degree 〈k〉 or the noise β
increases. Moreover, αopt is positive (around 0.6), indicating that cooperation can be
optimally enhanced if individuals give large-degree neighbors more help, but only to a
certain extent.
To explain the nonmonotonic behavior displayed in Fig. 2, we study an individual’s
payoff as a function of its degree. The theoretical analysis is provided as follow.
The cost that a cooperator j helps one of its neighbors i can be calculated as
cji =
kαi∑
lǫΩj
kαl
=
kαi
kj
∑kmax
kl=kmin
P (kl|kj)kαl
, (5)
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Figure 2. (Color online) The fraction of cooperators ρc as a function of α for different
values of (a) the benefit-to-cost ratio r, (b) the average degree 〈k〉 and (c) the noise
β, respectively. For (a), 〈k〉 = 10 and β = 0.5. For (b), r = 2.1 and β = 0.5. For
(c), r = 1.9 and 〈k〉 = 10. For fixed values of other parameters, there exists an
optimal value of α (denoted as αopt), leading to the maximal ρc. The insets show the
dependence of αopt on r, 〈k〉 and β respectively.
where P (kl|kj) is the conditional probability that a node of degree kj has a neighbor of
degree kl, kmin and kmax are the minimum and maximum node degrees of the network.
Since BA networks have negligible degree-degree correlation [37], we have approximately
P (kl|kj) = klP (kl)/〈k〉, (6)
where P (kl) is the degree distribution of BA networks. Substituting Eq. (6) into Eq.
(5), we obtain
cji =
kαi 〈k〉
kj〈kα+1〉 . (7)
According to Eq. (3) and the mean-field theory, we can write the payoff Mi as
Mi = − ρc + rρc
∑
cji
= − ρc + rρcki
kmax∑
kj=kmin
P (kj|ki)cji. (8)
Substituting Eqs. (6) and (7) into Eq. (8), we obtain
Mi = −ρc + rρck
α+1
i
〈kα+1〉 . (9)
From Eq. (9), one can find that for α > −1(< −1), higher-degree (lower-degree)
individuals gain higher payoffs. In the case of α = −1, individuals with different degree
classes have the same payoffs.
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Figure 3. (Color online) The payoff Mk as a function of degree k for different values
of α. The benefit-to-cost ratio r = 40 and the average degree 〈k〉 = 20. All individuals
are set to be cooperators. The data point are simulation results and the solid curves
are theoretical results from Eq. (9).
The quantity 〈kα+1〉 can be calculated as 〈kα+1〉 ∫ kmax
kmin
kα+1P (k)dk, where the degree
distribution of BA networks is P (k) = 2k2mink
−3 [37] and the maximum node degree of
the network is about kmax = kmin
√
N [38]. After calculating the integral, we obtain
〈k2〉 = k2min lnN and 〈kα+1〉 = 2kα+1min (N
α−1
2 − 1)/(α− 1) (for α 6= 1). From Fig. 3, one
can see that the theoretical and numerical results are consistent.
For very small values of α, lower-degree individuals gain more payoffs. Besides,
the scale-free network is mainly composed of low-degree nodes. In this case, strategies
of low-degree individuals play important roles in the evolution of cooperation. Note
that cooperators gain less payoff than defectors in the same degree class. Thus, the
whole network will gradually fall into the state of full defection due to the presence of
abundant low-degree defectors. For large values of α, high-degree individuals (so-called
hubs) reap massive profits and gradually become cooperators [20, 21]. These hubs
and some of their neighbors will form a cooperator cluster [39]. Within the cluster,
cooperators can assist each other and the benefits of mutual cooperation outweigh the
losses against the outside defectors. However, for very large α, most individuals inside
the cooperator cluster gain nothing since almost all benefits are allocated to large-degree
individuals. In this case, low-degree cooperators have negative payoffs since they have
to pay the cost of cooperation. On the contrary, the payoffs of defectors are positive.
As a result, for very large α, the cooperator cluster is vulnerable to the invasion of
defectors and become difficult to expand. Combining the results of the two limits of α,
the highest cooperation level should be achieved for some intermediate values of α.
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Figure 4. (Color online) Time series of the cooperator density ρc for high-degree nodes
(top panel) and low-degree nodes (bottom panel) respectively. The average degree 〈k〉
= 10, the benefit-to-cost ratio r = 2.1 and the noise β = 0.5. Without loss of generality,
nodes with k > 40 (k ≤ 40) are divided into the high-degree (low-degree) class. For
α = −1, both kinds of nodes gradually become defectors. For α = 0.5, with time all
high-degree nodes become cooperators and most low-degree nodes choose cooperation.
For α = 4, although all high-degree nodes finally become cooperators, most low-degree
nodes choose defection in the equilibrium state.
To confirm the above analysis, we divide nodes into two classes: high-degree and
low-degree ones. Then we study the time evolution of the cooperation density for high-
degree and low-degree nodes respectively. From Fig. 4, one can see that, for a small
value of α (e.g., α = −1), the cooperator density for both kinds of nodes decreases to 0
as time evolves. For a larger value of α (e.g., α = 0.5 or α = 4), the cooperator density
for high-degree nodes increases to 1 while the cooperator density for low-degree nodes
first decreases and then increases to a steady value. For α = 0.5, low-degree nodes
inside the cooperator cluster can gain enough payoffs to resist the invasion of defectors,
leading to a high value of the cooperator density (about 0.8) in the stable state. For
α = 4, low-degree nodes get little benefit and are vulnerable to the attack of defectors,
resulting in a low cooperation level (about 0.3) in the equilibrium state.
Next, we study the cooperator density ρc(k) in the steady state as a function of
degree k for different values of α. From Fig. 5, one can see that for a small value of
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Figure 5. (Color online) The cooperator density ρc(k) in the steady state as a function
of degree k for different values of α. For each value of α, the fraction of cooperators
in the equilibrium state ρc = 0.5, the average degree 〈k〉 = 6 and the noise β = 0.5.
For α = -1, the benefit-to-cost ratio r = 3.95. For α = -0.4, r = 1.89. For α = 4,
r = 1.78. For a very small values of α (e.g., α = -1), ρc(k) is almost independent of
degree k. For a large value of α (e.g., α = -0.4 or 4), high-degree nodes are occupied
by cooperators and ρc(k) is minimized for medium-degree nodes.
α (e.g., α = −1), ρc(k) is almost the same for different values of k. For a larger value
of α (e.g., α = −0.4 or α = 4), almost all high-degree individuals become cooperators
while some low-degree individuals still choose defection. Here, we also find that ρc(k) is
minimized for medium-degree individuals. Such phenomenon has been observed in the
weak prisoner’s dilemma game [40].
In the above studies, we assume that each cooperator contributes the same total cost
ci = 1. To validate the universality of the enhancement of cooperation by preferential
assistance, we consider a case in which the total cost of a cooperator is not a constant
but proportional to its degree, i.e., ci = ki. In this case, there also exists an optimal
value of α, leading to the highest cooperation level, as shown in Fig. 6.
4. Conclusions
In conclusion, we have found that cooperation can be promoted when cooperators
contribute more to high-degree neighbors, but only to some extent. In this case, high-
degree individuals are proved to have high payoffs and act as cooperators. These hubs
and some of their neighbors form a cooperator cluster, within which cooperators can
assist each other and the benefits of mutual cooperation outweigh the losses against
defectors. The above finding is robust with respect to different values of the benefit-
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Figure 6. (Color online) The fraction of cooperators ρc as a function of α for different
values of the benefit-to-cost ratio r. The average degree 〈k〉 = 6 and the noise β =
0.5. The total cost of each cooperator is equal to its degree, i.e., ci = ki. For each r,
ρc is maximized at an optimal value of α.
to-cost ratio, different kinds of network structure, different levels of the noise to permit
irrational choices, and different choices of the total cost of a cooperator.
The heterogeneous resource allocation has also been considered in other kinds of
game models such as the public goods game. Huang et. al. found that cooperation can
be enhanced if individuals invest more to smaller groups [41]. Meloni et. al. allowed
individuals to redistribute their contribution according to what they earned from the
given group in previous rounds [42]. Their results showed that not only a Pareto
distribution for the payoffs naturally emerges but also that if players do not invest
enough in one round they can act as defectors even if they are formally cooperators.
Note that the donation game and the public goods game are based on pair interactions
and group interactions respectively. Together Refs. [41, 42] and our work offer a deeper
understanding of the impact of the heterogeneous resource allocation on the evolution
of cooperation.
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